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A quantitative definition of  risk is suggested in terms of  the idea of  a “set of  triplets.” The 
definition is extended to include uncertainty and completeness, and the use of  Bayes’ theorem 
is described in this connection. The definition is used  to discuss the notions of  “relative risk,” 
“relativity of  risk,” and “acceptability of  risk.” 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
As  readers of  this journal are well aware, we are 
not  able in  life  to  avoid  risk  but  only  to  choose 
between  risks.  Rational  decision-making  requires, 
therefore, a clear and quantitative way of  expressing 
risk so that it can be properly weighed, along with all 
other costs and benefits, in the decision process. 
The purpose of  this paper  is  to  provide  some 
suggestions and contributions toward a uniform con- 
ceptual/linguistic  framework  for  quantifying  and 
making precise the notion of  risk. The concepts and 
definitions we  shall present in  this connection have 
shown  themselves to be  sturdy  and  serviceable in 
practical application to a wide variety of  risk situa- 
tions. They have demonstrated in the courtroom and 
elsewhere the ability to improve communication and 
greatly diminish the confusion and controversy that 
often swirls around public decision making involving 
risk. We hope therefore with this paper to widen the 
understanding and adoption of  this framework, and 
to that end adopt a leisurely and tutorial place. 
We begin in the next section with a short discus- 
sion of  several qualitative aspects of  the notion  of 
risk.  We  then  proceed  to  a  first-pass or first-level 
‘Kaplan &  Associates,  Inc.,  17840  Skypark  Blvd.  Irvine,  CA 
92714. 
2Pickard,  Lowe and Ganick, Inc. 
quantitative definition. Since the notion of  “probabil- 
ity” is fundamentally intertwined with the definition 
of  risk, the next section addresses the precise mean- 
ing adopted in this paper for the term “probability.” 
In  particular,  at  this  point,  we  carefully  draw  a 
distinction between  “probability”  and  “frequency.” 
Then, using this distinction, we return to the idea of 
risk,  and  give  a  “second-level” definition  (of  risk 
which  generalizes  the  first-level  definition)  and  is 
large enough and flexible enough to include at least 
all the aspects and subtleties of  risk  that have been 
encountered in the authors’ experience. 
2.  QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE  NOTION 
OF RISK 
The subject of  risk has become very popular in 
the last few years and is much  talked  about  at  all 
levels of  industry and government. Correspondingly, 
the literature on the subject has grown very large [see 
for example refs.  (1-3)].  In this literature the word 
“risk” is used in many different senses. Many differ- 
ent kinds of  risk are discussed: business risk, social 
risk, economic risk, safety risk, investment risk, mili- 
tary risk, political risk, etc. Now one of  the require- 
ments  for  an intelligible subject is  a  uniform  and 
consistent usage of  words. So we should like to begin 
sorting things out  by  drawing some distinctions in 
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meaning between various of  these words as we  shall 
use them. We begin with “risk” and “uncertainty.” 
reduces risk. Thus, if we  know there is a hole in  the 
road around the corner, it poses less risk to us than if 
we zip around not knowing about it. 
2.1.  The Distinction Between Risk and Uncertainty 
2.3. Relativity of  Risk 
Suppose a rich relative had just died and named 
you  as  sole  heir.  The  auditors  are  totaling  up  his 
assets. Until that is done you are not sure how much 
you will get after estate taxes. It may be $1  million or 
$2 million. You would then certainly say you were in 
a state of  uncertainty, but you would hardly say that 
you  were  facing risk. The  notion  of  risk, therefore, 
involves both uncertainty  and some kind  of  loss or 
damage  that  might  be  received.  Symbolically,  we 
could write this as: 
risk= uncertainty +  damage. 
This  equation  expresses our first  distinction.  As  a 
second, it  is  of  great value to differentiate between 
the notions of  “risk” and “hazard.”  This is the sub- 
ject of  the next section. 
2.2. The Distinction Between Risk and Hazard 
It is very useful, especially in understanding the 
public  controversies  surrounding energy production 
and transport facilities, to draw a distinction between 
the ideas of  risk and hazard. 
In the di~tionary‘~)  we find hazard defined as “a 
source of  danger.”  Risk is the “possibility of  loss or 
injury” and the “degree of  probability of  such loss.” 
Hazard,  therefore,  simply  exists  as  a  source.  Risk 
includes the likelihood of  conversion of  that  source 
into actual delivery of  loss, injury, or some form of 
damage. This is the sense in which we use the words. 
As an example, the ocean can be said to be a hazard. 
If  we  attempt to cross it  in a rowboat  we  undergo 
great risk. If  we  use the Queen Elizabeth, the risk is 
small. The  Queen Elizabeth thus is a device that we 
use to safeguard  us against  the hazard, resulting in 
small  risk.  As  in  Sec.  2.1.,  we  express  this  idea 
symbolically in the form of  an equation: 
hazard 
safeguards  risk = 
This equation  also brings  out  the  thought  that  we 
may make risk as small as we  like by  increasing the 
safeguards but may never,  as a matter of  principle, 
bring  it  to  zero.  Risk  is  never  zero, but  it  can be 
small. 
Included under the heading “safeguards”  is the 
idea of  simple awareness. That is, awareness of  risk 
Connected to this thought is the idea that risk is 
relative to the observer. We had a case in Los Angeles 
recently that illustrates this idea. Some people put a 
rattlesnake in a man’s mailbox. Now if  you had asked 
that  man:  “Is  it  a  risk  to  put  your  hand  in  your 
mailbox?” He would have said, “Of course not.” We 
however, knowing  about  the snake, would  say it  is 
very risky indeed. 
Thus  risk  is  relative  to  the  observer.  It  is  a 
subjective  thing-  it  depends upon  who  is  looking. 
Some writers  refer  to  this  fact by  using  the phrase 
“perceived risk.” The problem with the phrase is that 
it suggests the existence of  some other kind of  risk- 
other than perceived. It suggests the existence of  an 
“absolute  risk.”  However, under  attempts  to pin  it 
down,  the  notion  of  absolute  risk  always  ends  up 
being somebody else’s  perceived risk. This brings us 
in touch with some fairly deep philosophical matters, 
which incidentally are reminiscent of  those raised in 
Einstein’s theory of  the relativity of  space and time. 
This  subject  will  become  clear  after  we  have 
given precise, quantitative  definitions of  “risk”  and 
“probability.”  We  begin  this  process  in  the  next 
section by giving the definition of  risk. We postpone 
the definitions of  probability until Sec. 4. This order 
of  presentation departs a little from the logical order 
because the definition of  risk uses the term probabil- 
ity. This works out all right, however, since the reader 
already has a good intuitive grasp of  the meaning of 
probability.  The earlier discussions of  risk will  then 
serve to motivate the detailed attention given to the 
subtleties of  the definition of  probability. 
So, qualitatively,  risk depends on what  you  do 
and what you know and what you do not know. Let 
us  proceed  now  to  put  the idea  on  a  quantitative 
basis. 
3.  QUANTITATIVE  DEFINITION  OF  RISK 
(FIRST LEVEL) 
3.1. “Set of  Triplets Idea” 
In analyzing risk we are attempting to envision 
how the future will turn out if  we undertake a certain 
course of  action (or inaction). Fundamentally, there- On the Quantitative Definition of  Risk 
Table I.  Scenario List 
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Table 11.  Scenario List with Cumulative Probability 
Scenario  Likelihood  Consequence 
Sl  PI  XI 
s2  P2  x2 
s,  PN  XN 
fore,  a  risk  analysis  consists of  an  answer  to  the 
following three questions: 
(i) What  can  happen?  (i.e.,  What  can  go 
(ii) How likely is it that that will happen? 
(iii) If  it  does  happen,  what  are  the  conse- 
wrong?) 
quences? 
To answer these questions we  would make a list of 
outcomes or “scenarios” as suggested in Table I. The 
ith line in Table I can be thought of  as a triplet: 
(SI  5  PI  9  xi ) 
where si  is a scenario identification or description; 
p, is the probability of  that scenario; and 
x, is the consequence or evaluation measure of 
that scenario, i.e., the measure of  damage. 
If  this  table contains all  the  scenarios we  can 
think of, we  can  then say  that  it  (the table) is the 
answer to the question and therefore is the risk. More 
formally, using braces, {  }, to denote “set of” we can 
say that the risk, R,  “is” the set of  triplets: 
R={(si,pi,xi)},  i=1,2 ,...,  N. 
This  definition of  risk  as  a  set  of  triplets  is  our 
first-level definition. We  shall refine  and enlarge it 
later.3 For now  let us  show how  to give  a pictorial 
representation of  risk. 
3.2. Risk Curves 
Imagine now, in Table I, that the scenarios have 
been  arranged  in  order  of  increasing  severity  of 
damage. That  is  to  say,  the  damages xi obey  the 
ordering relationship: 
xi  <x2 ex3  Q  *  *  *  Qx,. 
By  adding a fourth column in  which  we  write  the 
cumulative probability, adding from the bottom, we 
have Table 11. 
’Having defined risk as a set of  triplets, we  may now, in line with 
section 2.2, define hazard as a set of  doublets thus: H=  ((s,,  x,)  }. 
~~ 
Scenario  Likelihood  Consequences  Cumulative  probability 
SI  PI 
s2  P2 
s,  Pi 
sN-l  pN-I 
SN  PN 
XI  PI  ‘P2  +PI 
x2  p2  =  3  +P2 
‘N-  I  =pN  +PN-  I  xN-  I 
XN  pN  =PN 
If  we now plot the points (xi,  Pi) we obtain the 
staircase function shown as a dashed line, in Fig. 1. 
Let us next note that what we called “scenarios” 
in Table I are really categories of  scenarios. Thus for 
example, the scenario “pipe break” actually includes 
a  whole  category  of  different  kinds  and  sizes  of 
breaks that might be envisioned, each resulting in a 
slightly  different  damage, x.~  Thus  we  can  argue 
ourselves into  the  view  that  the  staircase function 
should be regarded as a discrete approximation to a 
continuous reality. Thus if  we  draw in a smoothed 
curve, R(  x),  through the staircase, we can regard that 
curve as representing the actual risk. Hence we call it 
the “risk curve.” 
Probably the most well-known examples of  such 
curves were  published in  the Reactor  Safety  Study, 
Wash 1400 [ref. (5)]. Figure 2 is an example taken 
from that study. Note in this example that the curves 
are  plotted  on  log-log  scale  which  results  in  the 
characteristic concave downward shape. In this case 
the asymptotes, as shown in Fig. 3, have the interpre- 
tation  of  “maximum possible damage” and “proba- 
bility of  any damage at all.” 
3.3.  Comments on the Definition 
One often hears it said that “risk is probability 
times consequence.” We  find this definition mislead- 
ing  and  prefer  instead,  in  keeping  with  the  set 
of  triplets  idea,  to  say  that  “risk  is  probability 
and consequence.” In the case of  a single scenario the 
probability  times  consequence  viewpoint  would 
equate a low-probability high-damage scenario with a 
high-probability  low-damage scenario-  clearly  not 
the same thing at all. 
In the case of  multiple scenarios the probability 
times consequence view  would correspond to saying 
4The categories of  scenarios, incidentally, should of  course be 
chosen so that  they  are mutually exclusive and the same event 
does not show up in more than one category. 14  Kaplan and Garrick 
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Fig.  1.  Risk curve. 
that the risk is the expected value of  damage, i.e., the 
mean of  the risk curve. We say it is not the mean of 
the curve, but  the curve itself  which  is  the risk. A 
single number is not  a big enough concept  to com- 
municate the idea of  risk. It takes a whole curve. 
Now the truth is that a curve is not a big enough 
concept either. It takes a whole family of  curves to 
fully communicate the idea of  risk. This is the basis 
for  the  level  2  definition  to  which  we  shall  come 
shortly.  First  we  pick  up  some  further  points  in 
connection with level  1. 
3.4.  Multidimensional Damage 
In many applications, it is appropriate to iden- 
tify different  types of  damage, e.g.,  loss of  life and 
loss of  property. In these cases, the damage, x,  can be 
regarded  as  a  multidimensional  or  vector  quantity 
rather  than  a  single scalar. The risk  curve now be- 
comes a risk surface over the multidimensional space 
as suggested in Fig. 4. 
In this case the ordinate, R(x,  y),  over the point 
x,y  is  the  probability  that  damage  type  1  will  be 
greater  than  x  and damage  type  2  will  be  greater 
than y. 
An example of  a risk surface, presented in tabu- 
lar form, is shown in Table 111 taken from a hearing 
on railroad  transport  of  spent  nuclear  fuel,(@ and 
modeled after a similar table given in ref. (7). This 
table at any box lists the probability that N people or 
more will  receive a dose of  D  mr or more as a result 
of  a shipment of  spent fuel. 
3.5.  Completion of  the Scenario List 
One of  the criticisms that has been made of  the 
Reactor Safety Study may be paraphrased essentially 
as follows: 
A risk analysis is essentially a listing of  scenarios. In reality, 
the  list  is  infinite. Your  analysis,  and  any  analysis,  is 
perforce finite, hence incomplete. Therefore no matter how 
thoroughly  and carefully you have done your work, I  am On the Quantitative Definition of  Risk  15 
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Fig. 2.  Frequency of  fatalities due to man-caused events. 
Nevertheless, the critic has made a good point 
about the risk  analysis formalism. Let us see there- 
not going to trust your results. I’m not  worried about the 
scenarios you have identified, but about those you haven’t 
thought of. Thus I am never going to be satisfied.  -  -- 
fore what can be done to improve the formalism to 
The  critic  here  has  a  valid  point  about  risk 
analysis. The implied conclusion, that we  should not 
build  nuclear  reactors, is  not  valid.  For  whatever 
course of  action, or nonaction, is proposed in place of 
building reactors must also be subject to a risk analy- 
sis. That risk analysis will also have the same inherent 
limitation as the Reactor  Safety  Study. That limita- 
tion in  itself, therefore, cannot be used  to argue for 
one branch of  the decision tree over another since it 
applies to all branches. 
address this point. 
One tactic that comes to mind, in light of  the 
fact  that  the  si  are  categories of  scenarios, is  to 
include another category, sN+  ,  ,  to the list. We may 
call this category the “other” category. By definition, 
it contains all scenarios not otherwise included in the 
list. Correspondingly we  would  now  say that a risk 
analysis is a set of  triplets: 
R={(si,pi,xi)},xi=1,2  ,...,  N+1 16  Kaplan and Garrick 
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Fig. 3.  Risk curve on a log-log scale. 
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Table 111.  Probability of  Human  Exposure to Radiation“, 
Number 
of 
people,  Dose, mr 
N/D  1  10  102  10’  lo4  105  106 
1  1.17X10-5  1.17X10-s  1.17X10P5  1.16X10-5  9.00X10-6  4.24X10-6  1.69X10-6 
10  1.17X10-5  1.17X10-5  1.15X10-5  8.90X10-6  4.54X1OP6  1.79X10-6  4.15X10-7 
lo2  1.17X10-5  1.17X10-5  8.65X10-6  5.O5X1OP6  1.03X10-6  5.45XIO-’  7.74X1OP8 
lo3  1.17X10P5  1.14X10-5  6.05X10-6  2.63X10-6  6.95X10-7  1.50X10-7  4.27X10-9 
lo4  1.03X  7.40X  3.60X  1.24X  2.96X lo-’  1.64X lo-’  2.26X lo-” 
lo5  8.45X10-’  5.95X10-6  2.31X10-6  6.70X10P7  1.14X10-7  2.85X10-’0 
“In a 1,000-mile-long train shipment of  spent nuclear fuel, probability that N or more persons will receive D or 
more  dose  to  the  whole body  from gross  fission products which  are  released in  an accident  during  this 
shipment and which deposit (Le., Fallout) on the ground. 
hP( r  N,  >D). 
which includes all the scenarios we have thought of, 
and also an allowance for those we have not thought 
of. 
Thus extended, the set of  scenarios may  be said 
to be logically complete. 
It seems at first glance that what we have done 
here is simply a logical trick which does not address 
the fundamental objection. It is a little bit more than 
a trick, however. For one thing, it takes the argument 
out  of  the  verbal  realm  and  into  the  quantitative 
realm.  Instead  of  the  emotional  question,  “What 
about  the  things  that  you  have  not  thought  of?” 
“What probability should we  assign to the residual 
category sN+ 
Once the question has been phrased in this way, 
we can proceed like rational people, in the same way 
we  do to assign any probability. We  ask  what  evi- 
dence do we  have on  this point? What knowledge, 
what relevant experience? In particular, we  note that 
one piece of  evidence is always present-namely  that 
scenarios of  the  type  sN+l  have  not  occurred  yet, 
otherwise we would have included them elsewhere on 
the list. 
How much is this piece of  evidence worth? This 
is a question that can be answered rationally within 
the  framework of  the  theory  of  probability  using 
Bayes’ theorem. We shall return to this point in Sec. 
6. It is timely now  to explain the sense in which we 
are using the word probability. 
4.  PROBABILITY 
People have been arguing about the meaning of 
probability for at least 200  years, since the time of 
Laplace and  Bayes. The major  polarization of  the 
argument is between the “objectivist” or “frequentist” 
school who view  probability as somethng external, 
the  result  of  repetitive experiments, and  the  “sub- 
jectivists” who view  probability as an expression of 
an internal state-a  state of  knowledge or  state of 
confidence. 
In  this paper  we  adopt the point  of  view  that 
both schools are right; they are just talking about two 
different ideas. Unfortunately, they both use the same 
word-which  seems to be the source of  most of  the 
confusion. We  shall, therefore, assign each idea the 
dignity of  its own name. 
4.1. The Definition of  Probability and Distinction 
Between Probability and Frequency 
What the objectivists are talking about we  shall 
call “frequency.” What  the subjectivists are talking 
about we shall call “probability.” Thus, “probability” 
as we shall use it is a numerical measure of  a state of 
knowledge, a degree of  belief, a state of  confidence. 
“Frequency” on the other hand refers to the outcome 
of  an experiment of  some kind  involving repeated 
trials. Thus frequency is a “hard” measurable num- 
ber.  This  is  so  even  if  the  experiment  is  only  a 
thought experiment or an experiment to be done in 
the future. At least in concept then, a frequency is a 
well-defined, objective, measurable number. 
Probability, on the other hand, at first glance is 
a notion of  a different kind. Defined, essentially, as a 
number used to communicate a state of  mind, it thus 
seems “soft”  and  changeable, subjective-  not  mea- 
sureable, at least not in the usual way. 
The cornerstone of  our approach is the idea that 
given two meaningful statements (or propositions or 
events), it makes sense to say that one is more (less, 18  Kaplan and Garrick 
equally) likely than the other. That is, we accept as an 
axiom the comparability of  uncertainty. Since two 
uncertain statements can be compared, the next logi- 
cal step is to devise a scale to calibrate uncertainty. 
This can  be  done  in  several  ways.  The  most 
direct, however, is to use frequency in the following 
way.5 Suppose we  have  a lottery basket  containing 
coupons  numbered  from  1  to  1000.  Suppose  the 
basket is to be thoroughly mixed, and that you are 
about to draw a coupon blindfolded. We  ask: Will 
you  draw  a  coupon  numbered  632  or  less?  With 
respect to ths question you experience a certain state 
of  confidence. Similarly, I experience a state of  confi- 
dence with respect to this same question. Let us agree 
to call thts state of  confidence, “probability 0.632.” 
Now  we  both  know exactly what we  mean by  p= 
0.632. So if  you now say that the probability of  your 
horse  winning  tomorrow  is  0.632,  1  know  exactly 
what  your  experiential state of  confidence is.  We 
have communicated! 
In the same way, we  may define or “calibrate” 
the  entire  probability  scale  using  frequency  as  a 
standard of  reference. Note that  the process is en- 
tirely parallel to the way  by  which we  define “red,” 
“chair,” “seventeen,” and all words or other symbols. 
This  method  of  definition shows  the  intimate 
connection between probability and frequency. This 
connection needs to be recognized always and at the 
same time not  allowed to obscure the fundamental 
difference. Frequency is used to calibrate the proba- 
bility scale in a “bureau of  standards” sense. Once 
the calibration is established, we  then use probability 
lo discuss our state of  confidence in  areas where we 
are  dealing  with  one  time  events  and  have  no 
frequency information at all. 
In  this way  we  liberate ourselves from the re- 
strictions of  the relative frequency school of  thought 
(e.g., that  only  mass  repetitive phenomena can  be 
analyzed probabilistically) and create for ourselves a 
systematic, disciplined theory and language for deal- 
ing  with  rare  events,  for  quantifying  risks,  and 
making  decisions  in  the  face  of  the  uncertainties 
attendant to these events. 
This then is the definition adopted in this paper. 
For additional insight we  quote the following para- 
graph, from unpublished notes by  E. T. Jaynes: 
Probability theory is an extension of  logic, which describes 
the inductive reasoning of  an idealized being who represents 
degrees of plausibility by real numbers. The numerical value 
of  any probability (  A/B) will  in general depend not only 
on A  and B, but also on  the entire background  of  other 
propositions  that  this  being  is  taking  into  account.  A 
probability  assignment is  ‘subjective’ in  the  sense that it 
describes a state of  knowledge rather than any property of 
the ‘real‘ world; but it is completely ‘objective’ in the sense 
that  it is independent of  the personality  of  the user;  two 
beings faced with the same total background of  knowledge 
must assign the same probabilities. 
and, as further elaboration cite the following para- 
graph by A.  DeMorgan? 
We have lower grades of  knowledge, which we usually call 
degrees  of  belief,  but  they  are  really  degrees  of 
knowledge. .. .  It  may  seem  a  strange  thing  to  treat 
knowledge as a magnitude, in the same manner as length, or 
weight, or surface. This is what all writers do who treat of 
probability,  and  what  all  their  readers  have  done,  long 
before they ever saw a book on the subject.. . . By degree of 
probability  we  really mean,  or ought  to mean,  degree of 
belief.. . . Probability  then,  refers  to  and  implies  belief, 
more or less, and belief is but another name for imperfect 
knowledge, or it may be, expresses the mind in a state of 
imperfect knowledge. 
4.2. Distinction between Probability and Statistics 
Corresponding  to  the  above  definitions  of 
frequency and probability, as numbers, we  may  say 
that statistics, as a subject, is the study of  frequency 
type information. That is, it is the science of  handling 
data. On the other hand probability, as a subject, we 
might say is the science of  handling the lack of  data. 
Thus, one often hears people say that we cannot 
use probability because we have insufficient data, In 
light of  our current definitions, we  see that this is a 
misunderstanding. When  one has  insufficient data, 
there is nothing else one can do but use probability. 
4.3. “Probability of  Frequency” Framework 
Now there are two ways we could talk about the 
flipping  of  coins,  corresponding  to  two  different 
questions. We could first ask: What is the probability 
of  a head on the next toss? Alternately we could say: 
I am going to toss the coin 10,000 times. What is the 
frequency, i.e.,  the percentage of  heads going to be? 
In  the  first  method  we  answer  simply  with  a 
number, our state of  confidence on the prospect of  a 
head on the next toss, as reflected for example in the 
odds we would take in a bet. 
In  the second method we  are asked to predict 
the outcome, +, of  an experiment to be done in the 
’Modeled after ref. (10). p.  161. 
‘Further  discussion of  the foundations of  the subjectivistic theory 
can be found in refs. (8-  11). On the Quantitative Definition of  Risk  19 
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future. Since we  do not  know  this outcome we  ex- 
press  our  prediction  in  the  form  of  a  probability 
curve against it (Fig. 5). Thus in the second method 
we are led to the notion of  a probability curve against 
frequency as a way of, or a framework for, expressing 
our state of  knowledge. 
This notion of  probability of  frequency will be 
of  use  to  us  in  the  next  section in  expanding the 
definition of  risk. Before proceeding to this, we note, 
coming back to the coins, that the answer to the first 
question  can  be  derived  from  the  answer  to  the 
second.  Thus,  having  given  the  probability  of 
frequency curve p(  +) we would then, consistent with 
that, express our probability of  heads on the next try 
as: 
Thus the second method includes or encompasses the 
first. The reverse cannot be said, and thus the second 
method  intuitively  comes  across  as  a  fuller, more 
complete discussion of  the situation. 
5. LEVEL 2 DEFINITION OF RISK 
When one presents a risk curve as the result of 
an analysis, one of  the things that invariably happens 
is that someone asks: “How confident are you in the 
curve?’” In view of  our usage of  the term probability, 
the risk curve already expresses our  state of  confi- 
dence. It appears thus as if  the question is asking: 
“How confident are you in your state of confidence?’ 
In this form the question seems undefined and un- 
answerable. However, there is a valid thought behind 
it. What we  need  to do, therefore, is to expand our 
framework somehow, in  such a way  that within the 
enlarged  framework  the  question  can  be  given  a 
precise meaning and then be answered. 
5.1.  Risk Curves in Frequency Format 
For this purpose we make use of  the probability 
of  frequency idea in the following way. We imagine a 
thought experiment in which we  undertake the pro- 
posed  course  of  action,  or  inaction,  many,  many 
times. At the end of  this experiment we  will  be able 
to look back at the records and ask: “How frequently 
did scenario  si occur?” This frequency will then be an 
experimentally measured number. Let us denote it by 
+i.  Its units are occurrences per trial. 
At the end of  the experiment, therefore, we will 
have the set of  numbers, $Ij, and the set of  triplets: 
{(S~,+~,X~)}  i=l, ...,  N+I. 
’For  example, the major criticism b,  the Lewis Committee‘’*) of 
the Rmctor Sufety Srudy(s)  had to do with the uncertainty of  the 
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Fig. 6.  Risk curve in frequency format. 
As in Sec. 3.2. we could then compute the cumulative 
frequency: 
@,  =  E  cp, 
x, ax, 
(where the sum is over all scenarios having damage 
equal to or greater than xi). Also  as in Sec. 3.2,  we 
could now  plot  @  vs.  x, obtaining Fig. 6 which we 
refer  to  as  a  risk  curve  in  frequency format. This 
whole curve may be regarded as the outcome of  our 
thought experiment. 
5.2.  Inclusion of  Uncertainty 
Now  since we  have  not  yet  actually done  the 
thought experiment of  the previous section, we  have 
uncertainty about  what its outcome would  be. The 
degree of  uncertainty depends upon our total state of 
knowledge as of  right  now;  upon  all  the evidence, 
data, and experience with similar courses of  action in 
the  past.  We  seek  therefore  to  express  this  un- 
certainty using, naturally, the language of  probabil- 
ity. 
Since the thing we are uncertain about is a curve, 
(P( x),  we  express the uncertainty by  embedding this 
curve in a space of  curves and erecting a probability 
distribution over this space. 
Pictorially, this is represented by  a diagram of 
the form of  Fig. 7. This figure is what we  call a risk 
curve in probability of  frequency format. It consists 
of  a  family  of  curves,  (PP(x),  with  the  parameter 
being the cumulative probability. To use this diagram 
we would, for example, enter with a specific x  value 
and choose say  the curve P=0.90.  The ordinate of 
this  curve  (P,,,w(x)  is  then  the  90th  percentile 
frequency of  x. That is to say, we are 90% confident 
that  the  frequency with  which  damage level  x  or 
greater occurs, is not larger than @'o,w(x). 
Figure  7  is  the  pictorial  form  of  our  level  2 
definition  of  risk.  It  is  of  interest  to  express ths 
definition also in terms of  the set of  triplets idea. On the Quantitative Definition of  Risk 
LOG 9 
21 
LOG x 
LEVELOF DAMAGE 
Fig. 7. Risk curve in probability of  frequency format. 
5.3. Set of Triplets Including Uncertainty 
In listing our set of  triplets for a proposed course 
of  action, suppose that we now acknowledge that, to 
tell the truth about it, we do not know the frequency 
with  which  scenario category si occurs.  We  would 
then  express  our  state  of  knowledge  about  this 
frequency with a probability curve pi(+i)  is the prob- 
ability density function for the frequency +i,  of  the 
ith scenario. Thus we now have a set of  triplets in the 
form: 
R =  { (si  9 pi(+i),  xi)  1  (1) 
which set of  triplets, we  could say, is the risk includ- 
ing uncertainty in frequency. 
From set (1) we  can construct the risk  family 
Fig. 7 by cumulating frequencies from the bottom in 
a manner entirely parallel to that used in Sec. 3.2. 
Similarly, if  there is uncertainty in the damage 
also, we would have the set of  triplets: 
or more generally, 
using a joint distribution on +i, xi. In this case also 
we can construct the risk family of  curves, Fig. 7. The 
method for doing this is for our present purposes a 
mechanical detail and is outlined in the Appendix. 
5.4.  Comments on the Level  2 Definition 
Figure 7, or equivalently equations (I),  (2), or 
(3),  constitutes our  expanded  level  2  definition of 
risk. We observe that it includes the level 1 definition 
in the sense that the expected frequency, 5(  x),  at any 
x is the probability P(x)  at that X.  Thus we have lost 
nothing  in  going from level  1  to level  2  and have 
gained the ability to explicitly include uncertainty in 
the calculation of  risk. This is particularly important 
in risk analyses, such as in ref.  (5), where scenarios 
are identified using fault trees and event trees, and 
where the fundamental input data on failure rates of 
components is uncertain. 
The  explicit  inclusion of  uncertainty  also  al- 
lows us  to  avoid  the  awkward notion  of  “relative 
risk”(”. 13)  which was introduced to compare the risk 
of  different designs or systei is when there was little 
confidence in the calculations of  the individual risks 
themselves.  In  the  level  2  point  of  view,  the  un- 
certainty is an intrinsic part of  the risk, as it should 22  Kaplan and Garrick 
be,  and  the  comparison  of  two  systems  is  readily 
done by viewing Fig. 7  for the  two systems side by 
side. 
The use of  the term “relative”  in the preceding 
paragraph  refers  to  comparing  two  things  being 
looked at; i.e., alternate plant designs or courses of 
action, etc. In Sec. 2.3, relativity of  risk was used in 
another sense, in  comparing who it is  that  is doing 
the looking. In the latter sense, risk is always relative 
to the observer. It is subjective just as is probability 
itself. It depends on what the observer knows. 
On  the  other  hand,  however, as Jaynes  points 
out in the last sentence of  his definition (Sec. 4.1) any 
two  rational  observers  given  the  same  totality  of 
information must calculate the same Fig. 7, and thus 
agree on the quantification of  risk. 
In this sense, we  may say that the level 2 defini- 
tion of  risk is “absolute” and “objective.” It depends 
upon  the  evidence at hand,  but other  than  that is 
independent of  the personality  of  the user. Two ra- 
tional beings given the identical evidence must assess 
the risk identically. 
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE FREQUENCIES OF 
SCENARIOS, INCLUDING THE “OTHER’ 
THEOREM 
SCENARIO-  THE USE OF BAYES’ 
We  have  now  said,  essentially,  that  risk  is  a 
listing  of  scenarios,  and  that  any  two  rational  ob- 
servers, given the same total background of  informa- 
tion and evidence, must assign the same frequency to 
those scenarios. More precisely, they will  assign the 
same probability of  frequency curves, pi(  +,),  to those 
scenarios. In the present  section we  shall say a few 
words on the use of  Bayes’ theorem  in  this connec- 
tion. 
6.1. Example 
Suppose  for  example  that  the  scenario  under 
consideration is the occurrence of  a certain event, a 
turbine trip, at a specific power plant, plant  rn. We 
wish to know the frequency, qm,  of  this event.’ 
The information we  have relating to this point 
may be regarded as falling into three categories: 
(1)  Our  general  background  knowledge  of  the 
‘Harking  back  to  Sec.  5.1,  we  mean  by  +,,,  here,  the  average 
occurrence rate, Occurrences per year, in a thought experiment in 
which we  operate plant m  millions, and millions of  years. 
design  and  manufacture  of  the  turbine,  operating 
procedures of  the plant, and so on. 
(2) The experience we have had with our specific 
plant so far. 
(3) Our experience with similar turbines in simi- 
lar plants. 
For example, at our specific plant, we may have 
had k, occurrences in  T,  operating years. Similarly, 
the typec3)  data would consist of  a set of  doublets: 
giving the experience of  all plants which are deemed 
to be “similar” to plant rn. 
The question now is how to combine these three 
types  of  information  into  a  probability  curve, 
p(+,,,/E) expressing our state  of  knowledge  about 
&. The fundamental conceptual tool admirably suited 
to this purpose is Bayes’ theorem, which we write as 
follows: 
where p(  &/E),  the “posterior,”  is  the probability 
we assign to +,,,  after having evidence E; p(~$~),  the 
“prior,”  is  the  probability  we  would  assign  to  +,,, 
before learning the evidence E; p(  E/+,),  the “likeli- 
hood,” is the conditional probability that evidence E 
would be ohyerved if  the true frequency were actually 
+,;  and p(E),  is  the  prior  probability  of  the  evi- 
dence E. 
Now  to use Bayes’ theorem, we  would  express, 
or encode, the information of  types (1) and (3) in the 
prior, p(+,,,). This could now be called the “generic” 
prior. The plant specific experience, (2), would con- 
stitute the evidence and enters the calculation through 
the likelihood function: 
The denominator p(  E)  is then the sum, or integral, of 
the numerator On the Quantitative Definition of  Risk  23 
and  ensures that  the normalization of  p(@,,/E) is 
correct. 
Further details of  this application of  Bayes’ the- 
orem  may  be  found  in  numerous  published 
6.2. “Two-Stage” Use of  Bayes’ Theorem 
A more recent development consists of  a “two- 
stage” use  of  Bayes’  theorem in  which  information 
type  (1)  alone  is  used  as  prior  and  type  (3)  as 
evidence to generate a population variability curve. 
This curve expresses the fact that different plants in 
the population have different frequencies of  occur- 
rence of  this event. The population variability curve 
is then used as the prior in a second application of 
Bayes’  theorem  with  information  (2)  as  evidence. 
Details of  this two stage process will be presented in 
a subsequent paper. 
6.3. Application to  the “Other” Scenarios 
The same reasoning as above may be applied to 
s~+~,  the  category  of  scenarios  we  have  not  yet 
thought of  (see Sec. 3.5). In this case k,  =O.  In fact 
kj  =O  for all plants, j,  since if  such a scenario had 
occurred, we  would have added it to the list explici- 
tily. Thus the evidence, E, for scenario sN+I  is that it 
has not yet occurred in all the years of  experience so 
far. But this is a perfectly good piece of  evidence like 
any  other  and  Bayes’  theorem  applies  exactly  as 
before. 
Thus, the category of  scenarios not yet  thought 
of, may be handled by the same process as any other 
scenario category: The relevant evidence is assembled 
and  quantitatively  assessed  using  Bayes’  theorem. 
Thus,  this  aspect  of  the  risk  controversy  may  be 
brought closer to a rational, more unemotional treat- 
ment. 
7.  ON “ACCEPTABLE” RISK 
We  now  explore whether our  definitions offer 
any insights into the perennial question of  “What is 
the Acceptable ri~k?”(’,~,’*,’~)  At  the outset we  re- 
mark that when a question has been debated as long 
and as unsuccessfully as this one, perhaps that is a 
clue that we are asking the wrong question, or asking 
the question in the wrong way. 
There  are  two  difficulties with  the  notion  of 
acceptable risk: one major and one minor. The minor 
difficulty is that  it implies that risk is linearly com- 
parable. It implies that one can say that the risk of 
course of  action A  or design A  is greater or less than 
that of  design B. The difficulty with this is evident at 
the level 1 definition. For example, in Fig. 8, the risks 
are clearly different, yet  we  cannot readily say that 
one is  bigger  than  the other. They are not  linearly 
comparable. The situation is even  more difficult in 
the corresponding level 2 definition, Fig. 9, for exam- 
ple. 
Of  course  it  is  possible  to  reduce  these  risk 
curves, or families of  curves, to single numbers, for 
example in level  1 by  introducing a utility function, 
U(x),  against x  and  performing an  expected value 
operation : 
-  m  dP  U=-/,  U(x)-(x)dx.  dx 
In level 2 we could proceed similarly by regarding the 
set  of  curves  in  Fig.  7  as  a  discrete probability 
distributiod2’) over the function space of  curves @(x) 
For each such discrete curve, Qi,  then we calculate an 
expected utility as: 
and then set 
u= zpiq. 
i 
These  figures of  demerit  are  scalars and  thus 
linearly comparable. The risks could then be said to 
have been made linearly comparable, but only at the 
cost of  a great loss of  information in the expectation 
operation.  One  wonders  whether  it  would  not  be 
better,  rather  than defining an explicit utility func- 
tion, to simply look at Fig. 9 and say: “Design B will 
cost, say, A  dollars more than A.  Is it  worth it  to 
you?” 
Assuming we prefer risk B to risk A, to decide 
whether it is worth A dollars more we  would have to 
ask  ourselves what  else we  could do with  these  A 
dollars. Perhaps we  could obtain a much larger risk 24 
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Fig. 8.  Risks for two designs. 
reduction by  spending these dollars on  automobile 
safety, or drinking water, or SO,  emissions, etc.’ 
This brings us  to the major difficulty with the 
notion of  acceptable risk. That is, that risk cannot be 
spoken of  as acceptable or not in isolation, but only 
in combination with the costs and benefits that are 
attendant to that risk. Considered in isolation, no risk 
is acceptable! A rational person would not accept any 
risk  at all except possibly in return for the benefits 
that come along with it. 
Even then, if  a risk is acceptable on that basis, it 
is  still not acceptable if  it is possible to obtain the 
same benefit in another way with less risk. Or, if  it is 
possible to reduce the risk at small cost, then the risk 
’Perhaps  even, as Cohen & Lee suggest, by organizing computer 
dating services [see ref. (2), p. 1461. 
is unacceptable. Conversely, a much larger risk may 
be perfectly acceptable if it brings with it a substan- 
tially reduced cost or increased benefit. 
Thus  one cannot  talk  about  risk  in  isolation. 
One needs to adopt a decision theory point of  view 
and ask: “What are my  options, what are the costs, 
benefits, and risks of  each?’  That  option with  the 
optimum mix  of  cost, benefit, and  risk  is  selected. 
The risk associated with that option is acceptable. All 
others are unacceptable. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper  we  have  first  attempted  to  pull 
apart some qualitative considerations related to the 
idea of  risk and then presented two ways of  quantita- On the Quantitative Definition of  Risk  25 
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Fig. 9.  Risk curves for two designs in probability of  frequency format. 
tively defining risk. The second of  these, including 
uncertainty, appears to be comprehensive enough to 
deal with whatever questions and subtleties arise in 
the course of  risk assessment. 
In  light of  these definitions we  have discussed 
the  question  of  completeness  of  a  risk  analysis, 
and the notions of  relative risk, relativity of  risk, and 
acceptability of  risk. We have argued that the ques- 
tion  of  completeness can be  handled  in  a  rational 
way by introducing a category of  “other” scenarios, 
and  assessing the  frequency  of  occurrence of  this 
category using the existing evidence and Bayes’ theo- 
rem, just as for any “ordinary” category of  scenarios. 
We have argued that a single number is not a big 
enough concept to communicate risk. It takes a whole 
curve, or actually a family of  curves, to communicate 
the idea of  risk. Notwithstanding this, we  have indi- 
cated how the family of  curves can be reduced to a 
single number, but have urged caution in the use of 
this reduction since it inevitably involves a great loss 
of  information. 
Finally let us emphasize that the purpose of  risk 
analysis and risk quantification is always to provide 
input to an underlying decision problem which in- 
volves not just risks but also other forms of  costs and 
benefits. Risk must thus be considered always within 26  Kaplan and Garrick 
a decision theory context.  Within  this context, that 
risk is acceptable, which comes along with the opti- 
mum  decision option, all other risks are unaccepta- 
ble, even if  smaller. 
APPENDIX. CONSTRUCTING THE RISK 
FAMILY FROM THE SET OF TRIPLETS 
IN THE CASE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Let us begin with the set (1) 
0;  =frequency of  damage xi or greater, 
and 
Ili(  Oi)  =probability density function for ai. 
Then since 
a; =ai+,  ++, 
the distributions for  may be obtained by working 
up  from  the bottom  as in  Table  11,  doing  a  prob- 
abilistic addition at each step. 
The  probabilistic addition  is  expressed  by  the 
convolution operation: 
or, if  there is dependency, by 
In the case of  the set (3) 
of  which (2) is a special case, we define 
This  is  the  probability,  per  unit  +,  that  the 
frequency of  scenario si is + and that the damage is 
greater than x. We next augment this definition with 
so that now the integral of  Pi(+,  x) over +,  including 
+ =  0 in a Lebesgue sense, is unity. 
If  we now define: 
the  function  IIl(@,x)  can  now  be  plotted  as  the 
family of  risk curves, Fig.  7. We have  thus shown 
how  to compute Fig.  7 from the sets of  triplets (l), 
It may appear that this is a complicated compu- 
tation. In fact it can be done quite simply using the 
concepts of  discrete  probability  distribution  (DPD) 
arithmetid2').  This subject will be included  in  a fu- 
ture paper devoted to DPD methodology. 
(21,  or (3). 
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